The model employs an agent-based model for exploring the victim-centered approach to identifying human trafficking and the approach’s effectiveness in an abstract representation of migrant flows.

The purpose of the model is to examine whether and how mobile pastoralists are able to achieve an Ideal Free Distribution (IFD).

Interest-based compound economies generate monotonically increasing wealth inequality through multiplicative accumulation dynamics, yet the conditions under which gift-based reciprocal exchange outperforms such systems in collective well-being remain unquantified. We present Zensei Wago (全生和合), a seven-layer agent-based model comparing a Gift Resource Circulation (GRC) economy with a Compound Interest Circulation (CIC) economy under identical initial conditions. Across N = 5000 Monte Carlo replications (T = 700 ticks, N = 100 agents), GRC produced significantly higher collective resonance than CIC (p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = +0.171), above a critical prosocial threshold pm ≈ 0.698. Cohen’s d grows monotonically with duration — d = +1.943 at T = 1500 and d = +4.126 at T = 3000 — driven primarily by structural collapse of CIC resonance as inequality exceeds a critical Gini threshold (G > 0.333), while GRC resonance remains stable. The gift mechanism further decouples collective well-being from distributional outcomes, generating resonance through relational quality rather than material redistribution. Network topology analysis across seven configurations — combining a Watts-Strogatz rewiring sweep and a T = 1500 longitudinal replication — reveals that ring topology maximises GRC advantage (d = +1.17), that most topology-dependent reversals are transient (sparse and small-world both transition to significantly positive by T = 1500), and that a critical rewiring threshold of p ≈ 0.10–0.20 separates GRC-advantaged from GRC-disadvantaged network configurations. Scale-free networks remain persistently adverse (d = -7.24*), requiring structural redesign for gift-economy viability.

RAGE models a stylized common property grazing system. Agents follow a certain behavioral type. The model allows analyzing how household behavior with respect to a social norm on pasture resting affects long-term social-ecological system dynamics.

We develop an agent-based model to explore the effect of perceived intergroup conflict escalation on the number of extremists. The proposed model builds on the 2D bounded confidence model proposed by Huet et al (2008).

We propose an agent-based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young.

This study investigates a possible nexus between inter-group competition and intra-group cooperation, which may be called “tribalism.” Building upon previous studies demonstrating a relationship between the environment and social relations, the present research incorporates a social-ecological model as a mediating factor connecting both individuals and communities to the environment. Cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuation in a simple, two-resource ecology drive agents to adopt either “go-it-alone” or group-based survival strategies via evolutionary selection. Novelly, this simulation employs a multilevel selection model allowing group-level dynamics to exert downward selective pressures on individuals’ propensity to cooperate within groups. Results suggest that cooperation and inter-group conflict are co-evolved in a triadic relationship with the environment. Resource scarcity increases inter-group competition, especially when resources are clustered as opposed to widely distributed. Moreover, the tactical advantage of cooperation in the securing of clustered resources enhanced selective pressure on cooperation, even if that implies increased individual mortality for the most altruistic warriors. Troubling, these results suggest that extreme weather, possibly as a result of climate change, could exacerbate conflict in sensitive, weather-dependent social-ecologies—especially places like the Horn of Africa where ecologically sensitive economic modalities overlap with high-levels of diversity and the wide-availability of small arms. As well, global development and foreign aid strategists should consider how plans may increase the value of particular locations where community resources are built or aid is distributed, potentially instigating tribal conflict. In sum, these factors, interacting with pre-existing social dynamics dynamics, may heighten inter-ethnic or tribal conflict in pluralistic but otherwise peaceful communities.

For special issue submission in JASSS.

Reconstruction of the original code M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen garbage can model, realized by means of Microsoft Office Excel 2010

The study goes back to a model created in the 1990s which successfully tried to replicate the changes of the percentages of female teachers among the teaching staff in high schools (“Gymnasien”) in the German federal state of Rheinland-Pfalz. The current version allows for additional validation and calibration of the model and is accompanied with the empirical data against which the model is tested and with an analysis program especially designed to perform the analyses in the most recent journal article.

This is an extended replication of Abelson’s and Bernstein’s early computer simulation model of community referendum controversies which was originally published in 1963 and often cited, but seldom analysed in detail. This replication is in NetLogo 6.3.0, accompanied with an ODD+D protocol and class and sequence diagrams.

This replication replaces the original scales for attitude position and interest in the referendum issue which were distributed between 0 and 1 with values that are initialised according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 to make simulation results easier compatible with scales derived from empirical data collected in surveys such as the European Value Study which often are derived via factor analysis or principal component analysis from the answers to sets of questions.

Another difference is that this model is not only run for Abelson’s and Bernstein’s ten week referendum campaign but for an arbitrary time in order that one can find out whether the distributions of attitude position and interest in the (still one-dimensional) issue stabilise in the long run.