Computational Model Library

Our mission is to help computational modelers develop, document, and share their computational models in accordance with community standards and good open science and software engineering practices. Model authors can publish their model source code in the Computational Model Library with narrative documentation as well as metadata that supports open science and emerging norms that facilitate software citation, computational reproducibility / frictionless reuse, and interoperability. Model authors can also request private peer review of their computational models. Models that pass peer review receive a DOI once published.

All users of models published in the library must cite model authors when they use and benefit from their code.

Please check out our model publishing tutorial and feel free to contact us if you have any questions or concerns about publishing your model(s) in the Computational Model Library.

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Information Spread

Aaron Beck | Published Thursday, December 02, 2021

Our model shows how disinformation spreads on a random network of individuals. The network is weighted and directed. We are looking at how different factors affect how fast, or how many people get “infected” with the misinformation. One of the main factors that we were curious about was perceived trustworthiness. This is because we want to see if people of power, or a high degree of perceived trustworthiness, were able to push misinformation to more people and convert more people to believe the information.

This model examines how financial and social top-down interventions interplay with the internal self-organizing dynamics of a fishing community. The aim is to transform from hierarchical fishbuyer-fisher relationship into fishing cooperatives.

Evolution of cooperation with strangers

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 15, 2010 | Last modified Wednesday, November 13, 2013

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

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