In his 2003 book, Historical Dynamics (ch. 4), Turchin describes and briefly analyzes a spatial ABM of his metaethnic frontier theory, which is essentially a formalization of a theory by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century. In the model, polities compete with neighboring polities and can absorb them into an empire. Groups possess “asabiya”, a measure of social solidarity and a sense of shared purpose. Regions that share borders with other groups will have increased asabiya do to salient us vs. them competition. High asabiya enhances the ability to grow, work together, and hence wage war on neighboring groups and assimilate them into an empire. The larger the frontier, the higher the empire’s asabiya.
As an empire expands, (1) increased access to resources drives further growth; (2) internal conflict decreases asabiya among those who live far from the frontier; and (3) expanded size of the frontier decreases ability to wage war along all frontiers. When an empire’s asabiya decreases too much, it collapses.  Another group with more compelling asabiya eventually helps establish a new empire.

A simple model illustrating RA Fisher’s (1930) reconciliation of Darwinian selection with particulate genetic contributions.

This model takes concepts from a JASSS paper this is accepted for the October, 2023 edition and applies the concepts to empirical data from counties surrounding and including Cleveland Ohio. The agent-based model has a proportional number of agents in each of the counties to represent the correct proportions of adults in these counties. The adoption decision probability uses the equations from Bass (1969) as adapted by Rand & Rust (2011). It also includes the Outgroup aversion factor from Smaldino, who initially had used a different imitation model on line grid. This model uses preferential attachment network as a metaphor for social networks influencing adoption. The preferential network can be adjusted in the model to be created based on both nodes preferred due to higher rank as well as a mild preference for nodes of a like group.

We consider scientific communities where each scientist employs one of two characteristic methods: an “adequate” method (A) and a “superior” method (S). The quality of methodology is relevant to the epistemic products of these scientists, and generate credit for their users. Higher-credit methods tend to be imitated, allowing to explore whether communities will adopt one method or the other. We use the model to examine the effects of (1) bias for existing methods, (2) competence to assess relative value of competing methods, and (3) two forms of interdisciplinarity: (a) the tendency for members of a scientific community to receive meaningful credit assignment from those outside their community, and (b) the tendency to consider new methods used outside their community. The model can be used to show how interdisciplinarity can overcome the effects of bias and incompetence for the spread of superior methods.

This model aims to examine how different levels of communication noise and superiority bias affect team performance when solving problems collectively. We used a networked agent-based model of collective problem solving in which agents explore the NK landscape for a better solution and communicate with each other regarding their current solutions. We compared the team performance in solving problems collectively at different levels of self-superiority bias when facing simple and complex problems. Additionally, we addressed the effect of different levels of communication noise on the team’s outcome

This code is for an agent-based model of collective problem solving in which agents with different behavior strategies, explore the NK landscape while they communicate with their peers agents. This model is based on the famous work of Lazer, D., & Friedman, A. (2007), The network structure of exploration and exploitation.

The (cultural) evolution of cooperative breeding in harsh environments.

Dynamic bipartite network model of agents and games in which agents can participate in multiple public goods games.

A dynamic model of social network formation on single-layer and multiplex networks with structural incentives that vary over time.

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.