Computational Model Library

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Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Complex Networks with Agents' Adaptive Expectations

Bo Xianyu | Published Wednesday, November 16, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

Nudging agents in social networks for collective action

Marco Janssen | Published Sunday, August 14, 2011 | Last modified Sunday, March 17, 2019

Agents are linked in a social-network and make decisions on which of 2 types of behavior to adopt. We explore consequences of different information feedback and providing targeted feedback to individuals.

Replication of ECEC model: Environmental Feedback and the Evolution of Cooperation

Pierre Bommel | Published Tuesday, April 05, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The model, presented here, is a re-implementation of the Pepper and Smuts’ model : - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2000. “The evolution of cooperation in an ecological context: an agent-based model”. Pp. 45-76 in T.A. Kohler and G.J. Gumerman, eds. Dynamics of human and primate societies: agent-based modeling of social and spatial processes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2002. “Assortment through Environmental Feedback”. American Naturalist, 160: 205-213 […]

Vulnerability of Cooperation Due to Limited Vision

Marco Janssen | Published Thursday, December 02, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model describes the consequences of limited vision of agents in harvesting a common resource. We show the vulnerability of cooperation due to reduced visibility of the resource and other agents.

cultural group and persistent parochialism

Jae-Woo Kim | Published Monday, November 08, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

Evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity by image scoring

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 22, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The model explores the possibility of the evolution of cooperation due to indirect reciprocity when agents derive information about the past behavior of the opponent in one-shot dilemma games.

Evolution of cooperation with strangers

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 15, 2010 | Last modified Wednesday, November 13, 2013

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Friday, August 20, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

Evolution of cooperative strategies from first principles

Marco Janssen | Published Monday, January 04, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The purpose of this model is to study the evolution of cooperation when agents are endowed with a limited set of receptors, a set of elementary actions and a neural network agents use to make decision

Replicating the Macy & Sato Model: Trust, Cooperation and Market Formation in the U.S. and Japan

Oliver Will | Published Saturday, August 29, 2009 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

A replication of the model “Trust, Cooperation and Market Formation in the U.S. and Japan” by Michael W. Macy and Yoshimichi Sato.

Displaying 10 of 71 results cooperation clear search

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