Hybrid attacks coordinate the exploitation of vulnerabilities across domains to undermine trust in authorities and cause social unrest. Whilst such attacks have primarily been seen in active conflict zones, there is growing concern about the potential harm that can be caused by hybrid attacks more generally and a desire to discover how better to identify and react to them. In addressing such threats, it is important to be able to identify and understand an adversary’s behaviour. Game theory is the approach predominantly used in security and defence literature for this purpose. However, the underlying rationality assumption, the equilibrium concept of game theory, as well as the need to make simplifying assumptions can limit its use in the study of emerging threats. To study hybrid threats, we present a novel agent-based model in which, for the first time, agents use reinforcement learning to inform their decisions. This model allows us to investigate the behavioural strategies of threat agents with hybrid attack capabilities as well as their broader impact on the behaviours and opinions of other agents.

I extend Lazer’s model by adding agent’s two kinds of imitation strategies: selective imitation and structurally equivalent imitation. I examined the effect of interaction of network with agent behavi

C++ and Netlogo models presented in G. Bravo (2011), “Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management”. Rationality and Society 23(1).

Ants in the genus Temnothorax use tandem runs (rather than pheromone trails) to recruit to food sources. This model explores the collective consequences of this linear recruitment (as opposed to highly nonlinear pheromone trails).

This model is a small extension (rectangular layout) of Joshua Epstein’s (2001) model on development of thoughtless conformity in an artificial society of agents.

This model simulates the emergence of a dual market structure from firm-level interaction. Firms are profit-seeking, and demand is represented by a unimodal distribution of consumers along a set of taste positions.

We build a computational model to investigate, in an evolutionary setting, a series of questions pertaining to happiness.

This model simulates the heterogeneity of preferences in a PG game and how the interaction between them affects the dynamics of voluntary contributions. Model is based on the results of a human-based experiment.

Individually parameterized mussels (Mytilus californianus) recruit, grow, move and die in a 3D environment while facing predation (in the form of seastar agents), heat and desiccation with increased tide height, and storms. Parameterized with data collected by Wootton, Paine, Kandur, Donahue, Robles and others. See my 2019 CoMSES video presentation to learn more.

This model is programmed in Python 3.6. We model how different consensus protocols and trade network topologies affect the performance of a blockchain system. The model consists of multiple trader and miner agents (Trader.py and Tx.py), and one system agent (System.py). We investigated three consensus protocols, namely proof-of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS), and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS). We also examined three common trade network topologies: random, small-world, and scale-free. To reproduce our results, you may need to create some databases using, e.g., MySQL; or read and write some CSV files as model configurations.