Our mission is to help computational modelers develop, document, and share their computational models in accordance with community standards and good open science and software engineering practices. Model authors can publish their model source code in the Computational Model Library with narrative documentation as well as metadata that supports open science and emerging norms that facilitate software citation, computational reproducibility / frictionless reuse, and interoperability. Model authors can also request private peer review of their computational models. Models that pass peer review receive a DOI once published.
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Displaying 10 of 138 results evolution clear search
Hominin ecodynamics v.2
C Michael Barton | Published Monday, September 19, 2011 | Last modified Friday, March 28, 2014Simulates biobehavioral interactions between 2 populations of hominins.
The Evolution of Multiple Resistant Strains: An Abstract Model of Systemic Treatment and Accumulated Resistance
Benjamin Nye | Published Wednesday, August 31, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013This model is intended to explore the effectiveness of different courses of interventions on an abstract population of infections. Illustrative findings highlight the importance of the mechanisms for variability and mutation on the effectiveness of different interventions.
CRESY-I stands for CREativity from a SYstems perspetive, Model I. This is the base model in a series designed to describe a systems approach to creativity in terms of variation, selection and retention (VSR) subprocesses.
NetCommons
Francisco Miguel Quesada | Published Wednesday, May 18, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013NetCommons simulates a social dilemma process in case of step-level public goods. Is possible to generate (or load from DL format) any different networks, to change initial parameters, to replicate a number of experimental situations, and to obtain a event history database in CSV format with information about the context of each agents’ decision, the individual behavior and the aggregate outcomes.
Replication of ECEC model: Environmental Feedback and the Evolution of Cooperation
Pierre Bommel | Published Tuesday, April 05, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013The model, presented here, is a re-implementation of the Pepper and Smuts’ model : - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2000. “The evolution of cooperation in an ecological context: an agent-based model”. Pp. 45-76 in T.A. Kohler and G.J. Gumerman, eds. Dynamics of human and primate societies: agent-based modeling of social and spatial processes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2002. “Assortment through Environmental Feedback”. American Naturalist, 160: 205-213 […]
Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management
Giangiacomo Bravo | Published Friday, December 17, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013C++ and Netlogo models presented in G. Bravo (2011), “Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management”. Rationality and Society 23(1).
Replication of a Social-Links-Evolution-Model
Sascha Holzhauer | Published Wednesday, December 01, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013ReSolEvo File output version
cultural group and persistent parochialism
Jae-Woo Kim | Published Monday, November 08, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in
Evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 22, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013The model explores the possibility of the evolution of cooperation due to indirect reciprocity when agents derive information about the past behavior of the opponent in one-shot dilemma games.
Displaying 10 of 138 results evolution clear search