Positive feedback can lead to “trapping” in local optima. Adding a simple negative feedback effect, based on ant behaviour, prevents this trapping

We study three obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming in the Mekong Delta (MKD) region. The failure of buyers in building trust-based relationship with small-holder farmers, unattractive offered prices from the contract farming scheme, and limited rice processing capacity have constrained contractors from participating in the large-scale paddy field program. We present an agent-based model to examine the viability of contract farming in the region from the contractor perspective.

The model focuses on financial incentives and trust, which affect the decision of relevant parties on whether to participate and honor a contract. The model is also designed in the context of the MKD’s rice supply chain with two contractors engaging in the contract rice farming scheme alongside an open market, in which both parties can renege on the agreement. We then evaluate the contractors’ performances with different combinations of scenarios related to the three obstacles.

Our results firstly show that a fully-equipped contractor who opportunistically exploits a relatively small proportion (less than 10%) of the contracted farmers in most instances can outperform spot market-based contractors in terms of average profit achieved for each crop. Secondly, a committed contractor who offers lower purchasing prices than the most typical rate can obtain better earnings per ton of rice as well as higher profit per crop. However, those contractors in both cases could not enlarge their contract farming scheme, since either farmers’ trust toward them decreases gradually or their offers are unable to compete with the benefits from a competitor or the spot market. Thirdly, the results are also in agreement with the existing literature that the contract farming scheme is not a cost-effective method for buyers with limited rice processing capacity, which is a common situation among the contractors in the MKD region.

The Sediba socio-ecolgoical rangeland model is an biomass growth model coupled with a social model of pastoralist behaviour in a commmon pool resource setting. The social subsystem is an empircal ABM.

This model simulates how the strategy one manages time affect the well-being that he/she can obtain.

The Opportunistic Acquisition Model (OAM) posits that the archaeological lithic raw material frequencies are due to opportunistic encounters with sources while randomly walking in an environment.

This is an agent-based model coded in NetLogo. The model simulates population dynamics of bighorn sheep population in the Hell’s Canyon region of Idaho and will be used to develop a better understanding of pneumonia dynamics in bighorn sheep populations. The overarching objective is to provide a decision-making context for effective management of pneumonia in wild populations of bighorn sheep.

This agent-based model was built as part of a replication effort of Jeness et al.’s work (linked below). The model simulates an MSM sexual activity network for the purpose of modeling the effects of respectively PrEP and ART on HIV prevention. The purpose of the model is to explore the differences between differerent interpretations of the NIH Indication Guidelines for PrEP.

This is the agent-based model of information market evolution. It simulates the influences of the transition from material to electronic carriers of information, which is modelled by the falling price of variable production factor. It demonstrates that due to zero marginal production costs, the competition increases, the market becomes unstable, and experience various phases of evolution leading to market monopolization.

This model simulates the interactions and dynamic trust changes between people which results in social group emergence and evolution.

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.