This entry provides an Agent-Based Model (ABM) of opinion and tolerance dynamics in artificial societies, implemented in the frame of the Concord/Partial Antagonism (C/PA) model. This version is specifically designed to investigate the impact of asymmetric influence through two leadership archetypes—Dictator and Democrat—within networked societies.
The model is highly modular, allowing the user to simulate three distinct social scenarios:
Baseline C/PA: Self-organization of a society without external influence.
Stubborn Leadership: Introduction of a “solid conviction” leader (Dictator or Democrat) who exerts constant pressure without changing their own stance.
Feedback Leadership: A democratic leader receptive to social feedback, where the leader’s opinion evolves based on interactions with the population.
Theoretical Foundations:
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This paper develops a spatial agent-based model to examine how fertility regime shifts reshape population concentration and wealth distribution in an abstract urban system. Migration decisions combine population preference, cultural homophily, expected net income, and resource endowment through a standardised softmax utility. The design is deliberately stylised: it is not calibrated to a particular country or city system, but is intended to isolate the feedbacks linking migration, fertility, urban scaling, and accumulated wealth.
The simulations reveal robust directional asymmetry. When fertility shifts from low to high, population concentration responds rapidly; when fertility shifts from high to low, concentration declines only after a detectable delay and may temporarily continue in the previous direction. Wealth adds a second layer of hysteresis: cell total-wealth concentration follows population concentration with delay, cell mean-wealth inequality and system-level wealth indicators are slower still, and phase-space trajectories form loops rather than collapsing onto a single population–wealth curve. Robustness experiments indicate that longer fertility cycles, wider mobility neighbourhoods, and smoother resource landscapes change the magnitude of delay and overshoot, but do not remove the qualitative asymmetry. The paper argues that demographic decline should be understood not as the mirror image of demographic expansion, but as a path-dependent transition mediated by fast migration-income feedbacks and slower fertility, cohort, culture, and wealth mechanisms.

An empirically calibrated agent-based model of cooperation among 14 EU member states. Adaptive state-agents update their cooperation propensity through behavioural inertia, influence along the observed intra-EU trade network (IMF bilateral flows), and repeated-game payoff indicators built from verified Eurostat, Eurobarometer and IMF data (2021-2024). An anchored logistic mapping makes the observed configuration stationary in the absence of shocks, so outcomes read as deviations from the empirical baseline. The model stress-tests European cooperation to 2040 under five scenarios of increasing severity, from a baseline to a Taiwan Strait crisis counterfactual, with 1,000 Monte Carlo replications and a full sensitivity suite (one-factor-at-a-time, joint parameter sampling, breaking-point analysis, alternative functional form). Documented with the ODD protocol; self-testing and fully reproducible under fixed seeds.

Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

Takács, K. and Squazzoni, F. 2015. High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(4), 2, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/4/2.html
We built a simple model of an idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. Our results show that inequality in employment emerges necessarily also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. We found that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality. Our findings help to corroborate empirical findings on higher employment discrepancies in high rather than low status jobs.

Aroused public opinion has led to public debates on social responsibility issues in food supply chains. This model based op opinion dynamics and the linkages between involved actors simulates the public debate leading to the transitions.

This model reimplement Weiner et al. 2001 Zone Of Influence model to simulate plant growth under competition. The reimplementation in Netlogo and the ODD description in the “info” tab try to be as consistent as possible with the original paper.

This model is an extended version of the matching problem including the mate search problem, which is the generalization of a traditional optimization problem. The matching problem is extended to a form of asymmetric two-sided matching problem.

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data