Evolution of cooperation with strangers (1.0.0)
The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games.
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Associated Publications
This release is out-of-date. The latest version is
1.3.0
Evolution of cooperation with strangers 1.0.0
Submitted by
Marco Janssen
Published Oct 15, 2010
Last modified Feb 23, 2018
The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games.