An agent-based model simulating West Nile Virus dynamics in a one host (American robin)-one vector (Culex spp. mosquito) system. ODD improved and code cleaned.

A generalized organizational agent- based model (ABM) containing both formal organizational hierarchy and informal social networks simulates organizational processes that occur over both formal network ties and informal networks.

This model is based on the Narragansett Bay, RI recreational fishery. The two types of agents are piscivorous fish and fishers (shore and boat fishers are separate “breeds”). Each time step represents one week. Open season is weeks 1-26, assuming fishing occurs during half the year. At each weekly time step, fish agents grow, reproduce, and die. Fisher agents decide whether or not to fish based on their current satisfaction level, and those that do go fishing attempt to catch a fish. If they are successful, they decide whether to keep or release the fish. In our publication, this model was linked to an Ecopath with Ecosim food web model where the commercial harvest of forage fish affected the biomass of piscivorous fish - which then became the starting number of piscivorous fish for this ABM. The number of fish caught in a season of this ABM was converted to a fishing pressure and input back into the food web model.

This purpose of this model is to understand how the coupled demographic dynamics of herds and households constrain the growth of livestock populations in pastoral systems.

An agent based simulation of a political process based on stakeholder narratives

An ABM, derived from a case study and a series of surveys with greenhouse growers in the Westland, Netherlands. Experiments using this model showshow that the greenhouse horticulture industry displays diversity, adaptive complexity and an uneven distribution, which all suggest that the industry is an evolving system.

CoDMER v. 2.0 was parameterized with ethnographic data from organizations dealing with prescribed fire and seeding native plants, to advance theory on how collective decisions emerge in ecological restoration.

a computer-based role-playing game simulating the interactions between farming activities, livestock herding and wildlife in a virtual landscape reproducing local socioecological dynamics at the periphery of Hwange National Park (Zimbabwe).

AgModel is an agent-based model of the forager-farmer transition. The model consists of a single software agent that, conceptually, can be thought of as a single hunter-gather community (i.e., a co-residential group that shares in subsistence activities and decision making). The agent has several characteristics, including a population of human foragers, intrinsic birth and death rates, an annual total energy need, and an available amount of foraging labor. The model assumes a central-place foraging strategy in a fixed territory for a two-resource economy: cereal grains and prey animals. The territory has a fixed number of patches, and a starting number of prey. While the model is not spatially explicit, it does assume some spatiality of resources by including search times.

Demographic and environmental components of the simulation occur and are updated at an annual temporal resolution, but foraging decisions are “event” based so that many such decisions will be made in each year. Thus, each new year, the foraging agent must undertake a series of optimal foraging decisions based on its current knowledge of the availability of cereals and prey animals. Other resources are not accounted for in the model directly, but can be assumed for by adjusting the total number of required annual energy intake that the foraging agent uses to calculate its cereal and prey animal foraging decisions. The agent proceeds to balance the net benefits of the chance of finding, processing, and consuming a prey animal, versus that of finding a cereal patch, and processing and consuming that cereal. These decisions continue until the annual kcal target is reached (balanced on the current human population). If the agent consumes all available resources in a given year, it may “starve”. Starvation will affect birth and death rates, as will foraging success, and so the population will increase or decrease according to a probabilistic function (perturbed by some stochasticity) and the agent’s foraging success or failure. The agent is also constrained by labor caps, set by the modeler at model initialization. If the agent expends its yearly budget of person-hours for hunting or foraging, then the agent can no longer do those activities that year, and it may starve.

Foragers choose to either expend their annual labor budget either hunting prey animals or harvesting cereal patches. If the agent chooses to harvest prey animals, they will expend energy searching for and processing prey animals. prey animals search times are density dependent, and the number of prey animals per encounter and handling times can be altered in the model parameterization (e.g. to increase the payoff per encounter). Prey animal populations are also subject to intrinsic birth and death rates with the addition of additional deaths caused by human predation. A small amount of prey animals may “migrate” into the territory each year. This prevents prey animals populations from complete decimation, but also may be used to model increased distances of logistic mobility (or, perhaps, even residential mobility within a larger territory).

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System Narrative
How do rebel groups control territory and engage with the local economy during civil war? Charles Tilly’s seminal War and State Making as Organized Crime (1985) posits that the process of waging war and providing governance resembles that of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups will extort local populations in order to gain power, and civilians or businesses will pay in order to ensure their own protection. As civil war research increasingly probes the mechanisms that fuel local disputes and the origination of violence, we develop an agent-based simulation model to explore the economic relationship of rebel groups with local populations, using extortion racket interactions to explain the dynamics of rebel fighting, their impact on the economy, and the importance of their economic base of support. This analysis provides insights for understanding the causes and byproducts of rebel competition in present-day conflicts, such as the cases of South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Model Description
The model defines two object types: RebelGroup and Enterprise. A RebelGroup is a group that competes for power in a system of anarchy, in which there is effectively no government control. An Enterprise is a local civilian-level actor that conducts business in this environment, whose objective is to make a profit. In this system, a RebelGroup may choose to extort money from Enterprises in order to support its fighting efforts. It can extract payments from an Enterprise, which fears for its safety if it does not pay. This adds some amount of money to the RebelGroup’s resources, and they can return to extort the same Enterprise again. The RebelGroup can also choose to loot the Enterprise instead. This results in gaining all of the Enterprise wealth, but prompts the individual Enterprise to flee, or leave the model. This reduces the available pool of Enterprises available to the RebelGroup for extortion. Following these interactions the RebelGroup can choose to AllocateWealth, or pay its rebel fighters. Depending on the value of its available resources, it can add more rebels or expel some of those which it already has, changing its size. It can also choose to expand over new territory, or effectively increase its number of potential extorting Enterprises. As a response to these dynamics, an Enterprise can choose to Report expansion to another RebelGroup, which results in fighting between the two groups. This system shows how, faced with economic choices, RebelGroups and Enterprises make decisions in war that impact conflict and violence outcomes.