Model of influence of access to social information spread via social network on decisions in a two-person game.

This model is supporting the serious game RÁC (“waste” in Vietnamese), dedicated to foster discussion about solid waste management in a Vietnamese commune in the Bắc Hưng Hải irrigation system.
The model is replicating waste circulation and environmental impact in four fictive villages. During the game, the players take actions and see how their decisions have an impact on the model.
This model was implemented using the GAMA platform, using gaml language.

The DINO model (Dynamics of Internalization and Dissemimnation of Norms) simulates a conceptual model on the dynamics of norm internalization in the decision-making framework of a 3-person prisoner’s dilemma game.

The simulation experiment is for studying the influence of external supervision services on combating corruption.
Algorithm: evolutionary game theory

ThomondSim is a simulation of the political and economic landscape of the medieval kingdom of Thomond, southwestern Ireland, between 1276 and 1318.

Its goal is to analyze how deteriorating environmental and economic conditions caused by the Little Ice Age (LIA), the Great European Famine of 1315-1322, and wars between England and Scotland affected the outcomes of a local war involving Gaelic and English aristocratic lineages.
This ABM attempts to model both the effects of devastation on the human environment and the modus operandi of late-medieval war and diplomacy.

The model is the digital counterpart of the science discovery board game The Triumphs of Turlough. Its procedures closely correspond to the game’s mechanics, to the point that ToT can be considered an interactive, analog version of this ABM.

In this simulation, we modify the norms game model to bid-rigging (collusion) model, while we can simulate also the norms game model.

The purpose of the model is to collect information on human decision-making in the context of coalition formation games. The model uses a human-in-the-loop approach, and a single human is involved in each trial. All other agents are controlled by the ABMSCORE algorithm (Vernon-Bido and Collins 2020), which is an extension of the algorithm created by Collins and Frydenlund (2018). The glove game, a standard cooperative game, is used as the model scenario.

The intent of the game is to collection information on the human players behavior and how that compares to the computerized agents behavior. The final coalition structure of the game is compared to an ideal output (the core of the games).

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

This model aims to explore how gambling-like behavior can emerge in loot box spending within gaming communities. A loot box is a purchasable mystery box that randomly awards the player a series of in-game items. Since the contents of the box are largely up to chance, many players can fall into a compulsion loop of purchasing, as the fear of missing out and belief in the gambler’s fallacy allow one to rationalize repeated purchases, especially when one compares their own luck to others. To simulate this behavior, this model generates players in different network structures to observe how factors such as network connectivity, a player’s internal decision making strategy, or even common manipulations games use these days may influence a player’s transactions.

This model simulates the Hawk-Dove game as first described by John Maynard Smith, and further elaborated by Richard Dawkins in “The Selfish Gene”. In the game, two strategies, Hawks and Doves, compete against each other, and themselves, for reproductive benefits. A third strategy can be introduced, Retaliators, which act like either Hawks or Doves, depending on the context.