Our mission is to help computational modelers develop, document, and share their computational models in accordance with community standards and good open science and software engineering practices. Model authors can publish their model source code in the Computational Model Library with narrative documentation as well as metadata that supports open science and emerging norms that facilitate software citation, computational reproducibility / frictionless reuse, and interoperability. Model authors can also request private peer review of their computational models. Models that pass peer review receive a DOI once published.
All users of models published in the library must cite model authors when they use and benefit from their code.
Please check out our model publishing tutorial and feel free to contact us if you have any questions or concerns about publishing your model(s) in the Computational Model Library.
Displaying 1 of 1 results cyberdefense clear search
SERDUX-MARCIM simulates the propagation of a cyberattack over the computational network of an organization in the maritime sector, at the strategic level of decision-making. It is the instantiation of ABM-MARCIM, the agent-based model of the MARCIM framework for the modeling and simulation of maritime cyberdefense.
Every computational asset of the target organization – servers, endpoints, routers, gateways, vessel systems, radars – is an agent that occupies one of six states at each time step: Susceptible, Exposed, Resistant, Degraded, Unavailable or Destroyed, the initials of which give the model its name. The states Degraded, Unavailable and Destroyed are associated with the D5 cyberattack effects (disrupt, degrade, deny, destroy, deceive) as a function of the degree and the duration of the attack. Thirteen transitions between states are admissible.
Unlike a conventional agent-based model, the local update function is not an individual behavioral rule. It is a system of six ordinary differential equations with eight time-dependent transition rates – propagation, cyberattack (degraded), cyberattack (unavailable), cyberattack (destroyed), recovery, sanitation, loss of resistance, and unavailability by other causes. The values of those rates derive from the capabilities of the target organization, the capabilities of the attacker, and the degree and duration of the cyberattack, computed through a cyber risk approach aligned with the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology, the ISACA categorization of security controls and the IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.
…