Nice Musical Chairs (1.3.0)
The NMC model allows exploring how land use competition may be constrained by social structure and dynamics, according to which individual stakeholders compete and cooperate depending on adscription to social groups.
The NMC model also enables to test the effects of two particular modalities of cooperative mechanisms: land use pairing, the awarding, in terms of productivity, of any direct collaboration between farming and herding within a group; and group management, the prerogative of a group leadership to manage individual stakeholders in order to pursue a particular proportion between farming and herding.
Lastly, the model allows assessing the effects of these mechanisms under either open or restricted access to pasture regimes.
Release Notes
Change log v.6:
-The seed of the random number generator can now be controlled, allowing for reproducible simulations.
Change log v.7:
-Corrects the “division by zero error” that exceptionally happened during the procedure resolve-competition (when both defender and contender have zero support).
-Competition counters are modified in the expansion procedures, instead of in check-competitions.
-The consequences, in terms of event counters, of the success of contenders during resolve-competition are simplified.
Associated Publications
Angourakis, A., Salpeteur, M., Ferreras, V.M., Gurt Esparraguera, J.M. (2017). The Nice Musical Chairs Model: Exploring the Role of Competition and Cooperation Between Farming and Herding in the Formation of Land Use Patterns in Arid Afro-Eurasia. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. doi:10.1007/s10816-016-9309-8
This release is out-of-date. The latest version is
1.4.0
Nice Musical Chairs 1.3.0
The NMC model allows exploring how land use competition may be constrained by social structure and dynamics, according to which individual stakeholders compete and cooperate depending on adscription to social groups.
The NMC model also enables to test the effects of two particular modalities of cooperative mechanisms: land use pairing, the awarding, in terms of productivity, of any direct collaboration between farming and herding within a group; and group management, the prerogative of a group leadership to manage individual stakeholders in order to pursue a particular proportion between farming and herding.
Lastly, the model allows assessing the effects of these mechanisms under either open or restricted access to pasture regimes.
Release Notes
Change log v.6:
-The seed of the random number generator can now be controlled, allowing for reproducible simulations.
Change log v.7:
-Corrects the “division by zero error” that exceptionally happened during the procedure resolve-competition (when both defender and contender have zero support).
-Competition counters are modified in the expansion procedures, instead of in check-competitions.
-The consequences, in terms of event counters, of the success of contenders during resolve-competition are simplified.
